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WORKING WITHOUT A NET: THE
SOCIOLOGY OF LEGAL ETHICS IN
CORPORATE LITIGATIONMark C. Suchman

"Advice for passing the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Exam: Always choose the second-most ethical option."
-Anonymous
The preceding epigram captures several important aspects of professional ethics: most obviously, it highlights the difference between
professional ethics and lay standards of propriety. More subtly, it also
suggests that the two, although distinct, are not unrelated. Professional ethics are, at least to some extent, grounded in "real" ethics;
however, professional ethics must explicitly incorporate the existence
of various competing moral obligations, in a way that purely aspirational principles usually do not. Professional ethics must allow
enough room for real life, and as a result, usually offer only a symbolic
display of vacant platitudes or a minimalist "floor" between the
merely sleazy and the undeniably corrupt. Either way, however, an
ethical profession requires more than just professional ethics. It requires a sense of right and wrong-estimable and reprehensible practice-that rises above the letter of the rules. And it also requires a set
of social structures for creating, preserving, and transmitting this understanding in the face of real-world challenges.
This paper reports the results of an unusual exploratory investigation into the normative beliefs and structural mechanisms that sustain
(and at times impede) the ethical practices of a core segment of the
American legal elite-the growing community of litigators working in
large urban law firms, primarily in the service of prominent corporate
defendants.' In 1995, in response to a number of highly publicized
* Reprinted by permission. © 1998 American Bar Association. All rights
reserved.
1. Traditionally, litigators in "white-shoe" corporate law firms have stood at the
pinnacle of the legal profession's status hierarchy, barely a half-step behind the federal judiciary and well above both in-house corporate attorneys and practitioners specializing in the representation of private individuals. Although there is reason to
believe that this situation may be changing somewhat, to date the realignment appears to have affected the degree of separation between various groups more than it
has affected their relative rank. See, e.g., John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar 322 (1982) (hypothesizing that the
legal profession is divided into two very separate hemispheres: corporate lawyers and
those serving individuals); Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel
and the Elite Law Finn, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 277, 277 (1985) (arguing that general corporate counsel has moved close to the top of the corporate hierarchy); Eve Spangler &
Peter Lehman, Lawyering as Work, in Professionals as Workers 63.75 (C. Derber ed.,
1982) ("[W]ithin the legal community, the most prestigious lawyers are those who
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cases of misconduct by such large-firm litigators, the American Bar
Association's Section on Litigation convened a task force of sociolegal scholars to examine the nature of "ethics beyond the rules" in
this portion of the profession. Unlike many officially-sanctioned ethical inquiries, the project began with the premise that professional
standards were at least as vulnerable to distortion by supposedly unreproachable elites as by more marginal practitioners. Without
prejudging the issue, the project team oriented its investigations
around the assumption that if the ethics of American litigators were
indeed eroding,2 important aspects of that erosion might be driven by
changing practices at the "top" of the professional pyramid, rather
than by failed social control at the bottom. Thus, the Ethics: Beyond
the Rules project represented an exploratory expedition into the moral
universe of what is arguably the most prestigious and well-heeled
component of the contemporary American bar. Through a series of
focus groups, open-ended conversations, and semi-structured interviews, we sought to learn whether large-firm litigators possess a sense
of right and wrong that transcends the formal rules of professional
conduct, and, if so, to determine: (a) what that moral sense might
look like; (b) whether it is adequately supported in the social structures of the profession; and (c) how favorable is the prognosis for its
survival.
The following pages outline several tentative conclusions from this
endeavor. In particular, I argue that the lawyers we observed possess
a fairly well-developed ethical sense, but that this outlook does not
map easily onto lay conceptions of ethics-as-morals. In part, this disjunction reflects the crosscutting obligations that the profession places
on its practitioners. Equally important, however, the disconnect also
reflects the growing inadequacy of the profession's mechanisms for
resolving ethical ambiguities and for transmitting moral standards that
rise above the baseline rules.
Given the exploratory objectives of the Ethics: Beyond the Rules
project, the research team chose to employ several interrelated qualitative techniques. All of these techniques involved extended discussions with individuals who were active, in one capacity or another, in
work for the large law firms that tend to the legal needs of the largest industrial and
banking corporations.").
2. As the term "erosion" suggests, it is difficult to discuss professional ethics
without using language fraught with evaluative connotations. Although most people
would accept the abstract assertion that ethical professions are preferable to unethical
ones, recent theoretical and empirical work suggests that real-world professions often
propound rules of conduct that are neither in the public interest nor even in the interest of the profession as a whole. The "erosion" of such rules may be no more lamentable than the erosion of a social caste system or an economic monopoly. Thus, while
the following discussion will eschew the linguistic contortions that would be necessary
to capture the full ambiguity of "professional ethics," readers should remain alert to
the possibility that not all ethical constraints are good, and not all ethical weakenings
are bad.
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the world of corporate litigation; however, the various components of
the investigation differed in their precise focus and, to some extent, in
their empirical rigor. In essence, the research was conducted in three
stages: (1) a preliminary project-framing stage; (2) a core focus-group
stage; and (3) a follow-up validation stage. This section briefly summarizes the methodology of each.
Preliminary Framzing
The project-framing stage was both the briefest and the least rigorous of the three. It involved several hours of open-ended group discussion on the topic of large-firm litigation ethics, conducted at the
1995 annual meeting of the American Bar Association's Litigation
Section. The seventeen participants in this discussion were essentially
self-selected, consisting primarily of senior partners (roughly evenly
split between men and women) in large urban law firms from around
the country. By virtue of their presence at the Litigation Section
meeting, all of these attorneys evidenced an atypically high level of
professional commitment, and by virtue of their participation in the
"Beyond Ethics" session, they also evidenced an atypically high level
of concern about ethical issues. Thus, although their comments foreshadowed several interesting and persistent themes of the project, the
participants in this preliminary conversation were deemed to be too
unrepresentative to provide a reliable picture of real-world conditions.
Consequently, the results from this session have been largely omitted
from the analysis presented below. Nonetheless, these early conversations did help to alert the research team to important methodological
and substantive issues, and in this sense they constituted a useful, albeit informal, pretest of the research design.
Large-Firm Litigator Focus Groups
The core of the empirical research was considerably more systematic, although still largely exploratory in character. Over the course of
two weekends (four full days) in autumn 1995, the research team conducted semi-structured group discussions with litigators from large
law firms in two major urban areas, one on the East Coast and the
other in the Midwest. The subjects in this phase consisted of ten partners (six men and four women) and nine associates (six men and three
women), drawn from five of the leading law firms in each city.3 Par3. All of the firms in our sample follow the conventional practice of hiring young
attorneys as "associates," a probationary status that these recruits hold for anywhere
from five to eight years before being reviewed for partnership. In most large firms,
promotion to partnership is rare, with as little as 10% of each entering cohort eventually "making partner." Much of this winnowing occurs through attrition, however,
and the odds for senior associates are somewhat better than the overall promotion
rate might suggest. In addition, in recent years many large firms have begun to offer
permanent non-partnership appointments, blurring the "up-or-out" character of the
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ticipants were randomly selected from lists of litigators who had practiced at the same firm for a minimum of three years.4 Biographical
information indicated that these informants spanned a wide range of
ages and family circumstances, and their comments during the sessions displayed a substantial diversity of opinion. Thus, although the
sample may not have been statistically representative, the selection
procedure appears to have captured a wide range of experiences and
viewpoints, minimizing potential biases and omissions.
The two weekends, scheduled about one month apart, were divided
into separate day-long sessions with partners and associates, respectively. On the first weekend, Saturday was devoted to the group of
associates (from both cities, combined), and Sunday was devoted to
the partners; on the second weekend, the order was reversed. Thus, in
total, this phase of the research provided roughly 160 participanthours of contact time (ten participants * eight hours/session * two sessions) with each group of attorneys.5
During this time, the research team employed a variety of discussion-oriented research techniques. As an initial stimulus, early sessions introduced the Fisons case, a real-life example of litigation gone
awry.6 Subsequent sessions brought in additional cases and hypotheticals, but the large bulk of each weekend was devoted to open-ended
group discussions of respondents' own experiences with ethical issues
and litigation decisions. At the end of the first weekend, the research
team conducted one-on-one interviews with all participants to explore
the extent to which participants' earlier comments might have been
artifacts of the group-discussion format. For similar reasons, during
the second weekend, participants were given short, anonymous "writing assignments" in which they were asked both to describe the ethics
regime in their firm and to suggest directions for improvement. In
promotion-to-partner decision. Meanwhile, at the partner level, many firms have introduced gradations among levels of partnership. Although these regimes vary from

firm to firm, most are designed to give attorneys an increasing ownership stake as
their careers advance and/or as their client-books grow. See generally Marc Galanter
& Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Law Firm
120 (1991) [hereinafter Galanter & Palay, Tournament of Lawyers] (concluding that
the organization of large firms will become more diverse in the near future); Marc
Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner
Tournament and the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 Va. L. Rev. 747, 806 (1990)
[hereinafter Galanter & Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger] (concluding that greater experimentation and diversity in the organization of large law firms will be common in
the future).
4. Due to the small size of the sample, the random selection procedure was relaxed in a few cases to ensure an adequate gender balance in each group.
5. This calculation is, of course, somewhat optimistic, because only one participant could speak at a time. Nonetheless, even by a more conservative accounting, the
sessions provided ample opportunity for all participants to state their views, often at
substantial length.
6. See Report, Ethics: Beyond the Rules, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 691 app. at 885-87
(1998).
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addition, for a portion of the second weekend, participants were separated into smaller subgroups, in order to facilitate more intensive discussion. All of these sessions were taped and transcribed, and each
member of the research team kept copious field notes.
External Views
The third phase of the project was devoted, in essence, to crossvalidation.7 Although the participants in the 1995 sessions were
drawn entirely from the ranks of large-firm litigators, many of the
"villains" in their accounts came from other segments of the barmost notably judges, plaintiffs' attorneys, and corporate in-house
counsel. Consequently, the research team decided to explore how
these three "external" groups viewed the same underlying
phenomena.8
To this end, in autumn 1996, the research team spent two additional
weekends conducting group discussions with judges, plaintiffs' attorneys, and in-house corporate counsel in the same two cities where the
team had conducted the large-firm litigator sessions. In all, these discussions involved ten judges, sixteen plaintiffs' attorneys, and sixteen
in-house counsel. The judges represented a variety of civil courts, divided roughly evenly between the state and federal benches. The
plaintiffs' attorneys were non-randomly selected from the upper echelons of the plaintiffs' bar, so as to provide a group of litigators whose
specialties-securities, antitrust, employment, product liability, medical malpractice, and the like-would routinely place them in opposition to attorneys from large corporate law firms.9 In-house counsel
were drawn from a list of local corporations with substantial legal departments; for each contacted corporation, the general counsel (or the
senior litigation counsel, where applicable) was invited to partici7. This endeavor began, informally, at the 1996 ABA meeting in Orlando, Florida, where the research team presented its preliminary results. Following the presentation, the team employed interactive audience-polling technology to solicit feedback
from the roughly 75 attorneys (from various segments of the bar) who were in
attendance.
8. Throughout this paper, I adopt the convention of referring to the various
groups of informants in the study as "large-firm partners," "large-firm associates,"
"judges," "plaintiffs' attorneys" and "in-house counsel," respectively. Since the focus
of the paper is on large-firm litigators, however, this category serves as the "default"
that is implied by references simply to "informants" or "participants." It is also worth
noting that "large-firm litigators" tend to serve primarily as defense counsel for large
corporate clients, while "plaintiffs' attorneys" tend to represent individuals, small
businesses, and class-action litigants in suits against such corporations. Although
there are certainly times when corporations appear in court as plaintiffs and times
when individuals appear as defendants, such configurations are exceptional for the
segments of the bar that we are studying here.
9. As a side effect, this frame produced a sample that was somewhat more senior
and more successful than the plaintiffs' bar as a whole.
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pate. 10 Once again, the sample of participants in all three groups was
far from random; nonetheless, it encompassed a wide variety of experience and opinion. Although some portions of the bar clearly were
missing (especially less elite plaintiffs' attorneys), those that were included sufficed to provide a vigorous empirical "interrogation" of the
preliminary findings from the large-firm portion of the project.
The format of this third phase was similar to the earlier round, except that each of the new sessions involved only local participants, and
hence all participants attended only one weekend, not two. On both
weekends, Friday afternoon was devoted to judges, Saturday to plaintiffs' attorneys, and Sunday to in-house counsel. This resulted in
roughly forty person-hours of conversation with judges, 130 with
plaintiffs' attorneys, and 130 with in-house counsel. Once again, the
sessions began with the Fisons case and then proceeded to more direct
discussions of participants' own experiences. Again, all sessions were
tape recorded, and team members kept extensive field notes. Due to
technical difficulties, however, only one of the two weekends was transcribed in full.
A

TYPOLOGY OF OBLIGATIONS

One message that came through quite clearly over the course of the
research project was that the language of normative obligation can be
quite slippery. Thus, as a starting point, it may be useful to briefly
outline what "litigation ethics" might mean in the abstract-and what
this term meant, in practice, to our litigator-informants. Rather than
being subject to a single set of obligations imposing a consistent normative orientation, the attorneys in this study seemed to be operating
in a world where obligations were differentiated along at least two
dimensions: (a) the logic of the constraint, and (b) the beneficiary of
the constraint.
Logic of Constraint
I will use the term "logic of constraint" to refer to the conceptual
distinction between three possible bases of action: the "moral," the
"ethical," and the "pragmatic." For non-lawyer members of the research team, one of the project's earliest revelations was the finding
that these terms carried significantly different connotations for our informants than for the general public. Although the differences might
at first appear to be simply terminological, they reveal a great deal
about how large-firm attorneys experience the normative dimensions
of litigation practice.
10. In one of the two cities, several corporations declined to take part in the study;
however, there was no discernable pattern to these refusals, and no evident bias in the
resulting sample of informants.
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In the lay person's view, ethics and morals are virtually synonymous, and both are quite distinct from pragmatism. Morality and ethics constrain behavior through the actor's ingrained sense of right and
wrong, even if such conscientiousness carries personal costs. Pragmatism, in contrast, serves the actor's self-interest, even if such instrumentalism contradicts social duties. Of course, in a smoothly
functioning social system, reputational effects and third-party sanctions often align morality/ethics with pragmatism by imposing costs
that make asocial self-interest less rewarding than compliance with social norms. Nonetheless, the motivations are still distinct, as illustrated by the hypothetical question: "What do you do when nobody's
looking?""
For large-firm litigators, the conceptual map seems to be somewhat
different. Both associates and partners repeatedly distinguished between ethics (meaning the letter and, to a limited extent, the spirit of
the professional rules) and morals (meaning substantive issues of right
and wrong). More importantly, these attorneys displayed a penchant
for blurring the lines between morality and pragmatism-and for
reading the rules narrowly, in ways that made ethics at best a secondary concern. As one member of the research team remarked, the
dominant orientation seemed to be one of "ethical pragmatism": an
outlook that compartmentalized any nonpragmatic aspects of morality, and that marginalized ethics as a floor or a lower limit on acceptable practice.' 2 A large-firm associate captured this sense of the
distance between "ethics" and "right and wrong" by noting that
"[m]ost of the issues that we're talking about here aren't issues of ultimate justice or even specific justice. They are questions of following
the rules so that cases will come out, and the right information will be
presented, and ultimately, justice will be served."' 3
In this view, ethical rules provide a loose framework for pragmatism, rather than a tight constraint on pragmatism. This orientation
could be heard, for example, in our informants' frequent reliance on
reputation-protection as an explanation for "beyond the rules" decision-making, as well as in their recurring emphasis on judges (and, to
a lesser extent, insurers) as sanctioning agents whose attentions could
save the profession from itself. As suggested above, both reputational
effects and external sanctioning agents allow social systems to align
11. This question is quite relevant in the present context, because (as detailed be-

low) most large-firm litigators conduct a substantial portion of their practices in situations where "nobody's looking."
12. See Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction,and Ambiguit: The Eve-

ryday Ethics of Defense Litigators,67 Fordham L. Rev. 739, 743-46 (1998).
13. Quotations of statements by study participants are taken from the author's
notes or from the transcripts of the study's structured group discussions. The transcripts, which are confidential to protect the identities of study participants, are on file
with Professor Robert Nelson of the American Bar Foundation. For a brief description of the study see supra pp. 838-42.
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morality and pragmatism, and our informants seemed distinctly ill at
ease with the prospect of justifying litigation decisions in purely moral
terms, without reference to these aligning mechanisms. 14 Indeed, at
times, attorneys' invocations of ethical pragmatism seemed almost
mythological in character:
You're expected to do the right thing, the favored thing, the ethical
thing. It makes sense for a lot of reasons. I think sharp practices
never work in the end. They always get you in trouble or get your
client in trouble, causing malpractice suits and things like that.
Thus, although informants repeatedly decried the laxity of realworld reputational mechanisms and sanctioning agents, the logic of
ethical pragmatism represented a basic taken-for-granted assumption
underlying these attorneys' interpretations of most potential "problem
situations." On the one hand, informants often assumed that bad conduct would carry a long-term penalty (via loss of reputation, wasted
effort, etc.), even when they could not identify a specific mechanism
that would impose such a penalty. On the other hand, informants also
often assumed that the "real" meaning of ethical rules was consistent
with pragmatic concerns, even when the letter of the rules was not.
(This, for example, was clearly the dominant understanding of the
facially restrictive rules governing deposition defense.) Unfortunately, in a world where ethical surveillance and reputation are in fact
quite weak, experience is more likely to contradict the first assumption than the second. And each time marginal conduct pays off, the
second assumption-that the rules should be read to permit pragmatically effective strategies-will operate to ratchet down the level of
ethical constraint.
Before proceeding, it is perhaps worth noting that our informants'
logics of constraint varied somewhat by social location. Among largefirm litigators, associates readily acknowledged the moral dimensions
of their work, but often collapsed these into pragmatic concerns.
Thus, for example, they frequently discussed morality in terms of how
an action would appear in a newspaper or to a judge or jury. These
imaginary external audiences seemed to provide a "reality check," or,
in the words of one associate, an "objective moral standard." The
"newspaper test" operates much like Mead's "generalized other"14. Given the methodological limitations of the present investigation, one cannot
entirely discount the possibility that the ethical pragmatism that we saw in large-firm
litigators was as much a rhetorical habit as a fundamental mindset. To the extent that
clients seek legal advice instrumentally, an attorney's ability to rationalize ethical behavior in instrumental terms may provide his or her only leverage against client demands for less punctilious conduct. Over time, such pragmatic arguments may
replace more lofty moral reasoning in the lawyer's rhetorical armamentarium-even
if the underlying moral motivation remains. While few of our informants directly
addressed this possibility, both large-firm litigators and in-house counsel concurred
that corporate clients increasingly ask outside lawyers only for technical and tactical
services, not for moral advice.
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providing a social looking-glass that allows one not only to see and
judge oneself (moral) but also to predict how one will be seen and
judged by others (pragmatic).15 Large-firm partners, on the other
hand, tended to deny the moral dimensions of their work entirely, and
16
to reduce most issues to either ethical rules or pragmatic strategies.
In a one-on-one interview, one partner had trouble conjuring up even
a hypothetical situation that would pose a moral dilemma unforeseen
by the rules (presumably bearing in mind the catch-all rule, "of when
in doubt, serve your client"). Another partner asserted that, in litigation, "the area of morals is a murky place to be, and you don't want to
go there."'"
Other informant groups varied more widely. Judges were quite
willing to invoke moral standards and were generally rather skeptical
of the claim that the litigation system effectively aligns ethics and
pragmatism, as well as the claim that ethical rules should be interpreted in light of pragmatic expedience. Plaintiffs' attorneys, for their
part, readily invoked moral logic, but it was generally a macro-morality of "doing justice"-even if this required bending the rules. In this
sense, these informants were equally pragmatic as the large-firm defense attorneys, but they were less concerned about the profession's
ethics than about its ideals. Finally, in-house counsel exhibited only
passing concern for legal norms of any kind and focused, instead, on
the often challenging task of reconciling managerial ideals, such as efficiency, profitability, confidentiality, and hierarchical authority, with
the vagaries of a court system that operates on starkly different principles. Thus, although they were often more willing than outside counsel to link ethics and morality, in-house counsel rarely framed this
linkage as a question of their professional obligations as lawyers.
In short, our results suggest that the dominant logic of constraint
among large-firm litigators is one of "ethical pragmatism," in which
true ethical violations are assumed (despite any contrary evidence) to
15. See George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society: From the Standpoint of a
Social Behaviorist 154 (Charles W. Morris ed., 1974).

16. It is worth noting that, to some degree, the observed difference between partners and associates may have been artifactual. The divergence seemed much narrower on the second weekend than on the first, perhaps because the partners had by
then recognized our lay conventions and grudgingly adopted them. Even so, how-

ever, partners seemed far more comfortable talking about "civility" than about "morality," a point to which I will return below.
17. Comparing the lay view, the associates' view, and the partners' view, one could

posit that the position of morality in decision-making "migrates" over the course of
the lawyer's career. When lay people enter law school, morals and ethics are synonymous, and both are distinct from pragmatism. By the end of law school, ethicality has

come to be seen as a professional construct, separate from "natural" morality- however, both ethicality and morality also remain differentiated from self-interest. As an

associate, ethicality continues to be seen as a distinct constraint imposed by the profession, but the two "naturally occurring" constraints-morals and pragmatism-begin to blend. Finally, as a partner, morals vanish from consideration, leaving only
ethics and pragmatism (with the former in a distinctly subordinate role).
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have adverse pragmatic implications, and in which inconvenient ethical strictures are assumed (despite any contrary doctrine) to have
pragmatically manageable real meanings. This logic differs significantly from the "ethical moralism" of judges, the "idealistic pragmatism" of plaintiffs' attorneys, and the "managerial morality" of inhouse counsel. Moreover, it also differs from lay conceptions of ethics
and morals as deeply-intemalized, self-effacing value commitments.
Nonetheless, as a taken-for-granted cognitive assumption, the logic of
ethical pragmatism allows large-firm litigators to reconcile-both rhetorically and behaviorally-the ethical demands of their profession
with the pragmatic demands of their result-oriented clients.' 8 To a
large extent, all other findings of the present investigation must be
understood in terms of their interaction with this distinctive mind set.
Beneficiary of Constraint
Constraints on legal practice-regardless of whether they are
moral, ethical, or pragmatic-can also be divided on the basis of their
ostensible beneficiaries. These beneficiaries fall into three broad
classes: (a) fellow members of the legal profession; (b) specific nonprofessionals with whom lawyers interact directly; and (c) society as a
whole. Each of these classes can then be further subdivided: duties to
fellow professionals include duties to opposing counsel, duties to coworkers, and duties to the profession as a whole; duties to non-professionals include duties to one's client and duties to third-party bystanders, such as expert witnesses; and duties to society include duties to
the integrity and smooth functioning of the legal system and duties to
the general welfare.
The large-firm litigators in this study spent the bulk of their time
talking about duties to other professionals, and, in particular, to opposing counsel. At times, discussions also touched on duties to clients
and duties to the legal system. Duties to third-party non-professionals
and duties to the general welfare, however, received virtually no attention from these informants. Interestingly, while focus groups composed of judges shared this intra-professional emphasis, groups of
plaintiffs' attorneys and groups of in-house counsel appeared signifi18. It is perhaps worth noting that the ethical pragmatism of large-firm litigators

is, in some ways, the flipside of what Luban and others describe as the "role morality"
of the legal profession: the belief that morally dubious adversarial advocacy can be

justified by its contribution to a larger system of morally worthy legal institutions. See
Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality, in The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and
Lawyers' Ethics 25, 36 (David Luban ed., 1983). Just as ethical pragmatism spares

attorneys from confronting contradictions between professionalism and expedience in
individual instances, "role morality" spares them from confronting contradictions be-

tween professionalism and justice in the aggregate. Taken together, the two outlooks
construct an almost-anything-goes regime, in which litigators see themselves as serv-

ing their clients, their profession, and their society by acting as zealous gladiators, in a
game whose rules are intended to be read permissively.
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cantly more willing than their large-firm colleagues to discuss ethical
obligations to third-party bystanders and to the larger society.Y This
pattern accords with Abbott's model of professional purity, in which
the status-honor of professional elites is seen as resting on their ability
to distance themselves from contamination by extra-professional disorder. 2 Although our informants might have talked very differently
in more naturalistic settings, in these homogeneous focus groups, bemng a member of the legal elite apparently correlated with a tendency
to address ethical issues in primarily intra-professional terms.
CONTENT OF ETHICS IN DISCOVERY PRAC-rICE

Over the course of the study, our large-firm informants provided
several insights into the substantive content of their tacit ethical rules.
Significantly, however, such substantive statements were far less common than a "cookbook" image of ethics might predict. Almost always, the first assertion about the content of "ethics beyond the rules"
was "it depends"-often followed by a very tentative and unsatisfying
list of conditions upon which it depended. Nonetheless, several areas
of substantive consensus (or at least focused disagreement) emerged,
especially during the later sessions. Rather than attempting to provide an exhaustive catalog of these, however, the present discussion
will simply highlight an interesting and unanticipated relationship between the content of attorneys' tacit rules and the cross-cutting typologies of obligations outlined above.
Morality as Civility in Intra-professionalRelations
As mentioned previously, large-firm litigators' focus-group comments centered predominantly on intra-professional obligations. Informants generally couched these discussions in the language of
ethical pragmatism; however, by the second weekend, many attorneys
began to introduce some (modest) normative considerations as well.
Significantly, though, even when the conversations carried moralistic
overtones, the groups showed little interest in (or concern about) morality with a capital "M." Rather, large-firm litigators tended to frame
the moral challenges of intra-professional relations as questions of "civility"-a normative standard, to be sure, but one suggesting that the
primary consequence of violation would be pragmatic inconvenience
and tit-for-tat retribution, not systemic corruption and depravity.
19. Of course, unsurprisingly, plaintiffs' attorneys and in-house counsel attended
to different components of these beneficiary groups, with plaintiffs' attorneys expressing concern about the role of defense attorneys in silencing powerless victims and
endangering the public, while in-house counsel expressed concern about the role of

plaintiffs' attorneys in harassing innocent managers and burdening the economy.
20. See Andrew Abbott, Status and Status Strain in the Professions,86 Am. J. Soc.
819, 830 (1981).
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Nonetheless, civility hardly seemed to be a trivial matter for these
attorneys. Among large-firm partners and associates alike, achieving
and preserving civil intra-professional relations represented a persistent topic of discussion, both regarding adversarial encounters with
opposing counsel and regarding collegial/supervisory encounters
within the firm. In particular, these attorneys repeatedly identified
incivility as a central characteristic of the profession's purported villains (small firms, lateral hires, mid-level partners, etc.). As one associate stated, "Those people ... are typically quite hardworking, but
they do tend to be people who.., are more uncivil than they ought to
be." Indeed, judging from the response that the issue elicited, one
could justifiably conclude that incivility would rank at or near the top
of our large-firm informants' complaints about the current state of litigation practice. For example, when asked for anonymous proposals to
elevate their firms' professional practices, subjects contributed such
items as "[y]ou must first identify ... the problems and the impediments to achieving the goal of what litigation ought to be. One of the
worst problems is incivility.... We need to act reasonably, independent of what the rules allow us to do."
Further, "[to] promote my own aspirations for professional standards: First, I would like to see written standards of practice regarding civility. Lawyers should be encouraged in writing to be courteous
and respectful of other attorneys, parties and witnesses." Thus,
among large-firm litigators, "ethics beyond the rules" seems, to a large
extent, to mean simply maintaining civil relations with professional
colleagues, rather than denigrating, brow-beating, undercutting, or ignoring them.2 '
Morality Versus Pragmatism in Client Relations
The focus groups also provided some insight into the content of
large-firm litigators' normative standards in the area of client relations-although, here, no single standard garnered universal support.
On the whole, informants portrayed their clients as being amoral,
short-sighted and excessively aggressive. Moreover, most attorneys
felt themselves to be under fairly close scrutiny (or even suspicion)
from clients who simultaneously expected no-holds-barred litigation
and no-frills billing. One participant in an early session captured this
outlook as follows:
Our clients are sending out mixed messages: "We want loyalty from
you ... but we are not going to reward your loyalty. You can work
21. It is perhaps worth noting that judges, plaintiffs' attorneys, and in-house counsel did not share this overriding concern with intra-professional civility. While occasionally decrying litigation's roughest edges, these groups seemed at least as

concerned about the ability of large-firm litigators to turn the process into a
hypercivilized game of manners, at the expense of more substantive ideals such as
truth, justice, and efficiency.
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very hard, but every time we have a new matter, we're going to put
it out to bid." And then, finally, the other mixed message: "We
want you to be economical-we don't want you to have associates
on every case, every phone, every conference-but we want a Cadillac defense."
While this image of the activist client was almost universal among
large-firm litigators, reactions to the situation subdivided into two
classes. One camp essentially capitulated to the constraint, adopting a
passive position as an agent of the client's will-and passing moral
responsibility along to the client-as-principal. This agentic stance is
well captured by one such litigator's comment that "if executives tell
the in-house counsel that there's nothing morally wrong, you can't go
against that." Other informants, however, saw the attorney as having
a more active fiduciary role, and asserted that they would make at
least a cursory effort at moral suasion if they felt that their client was
in the wrong. Nonetheless, members of this group also acknowledged
that such counseling was exceptionally difficult to implement in practice. The best chance, several suggested, was to couch moral concerns
in pragmatic terms; however, even this approach was deemed to be
risky, because it would leave the outside counsel in an awkward position if the in-house counsel were to argue for a more aggressive posture. Perhaps not surprisingly, several of the attorneys retreated to
the safe ground of ethical pragmatism, suggesting that a "CYA [coveryour-ass] letter" might suffice to discharge the attorney's advisory
obligations.
Predictably, in-house counsel painted quite a different picture of the
attorney-client dynamic, portraying themselves as champions of reason vis-A-vis outside attorneys (whose incomes, they argued, depend
on protracted litigation). Moreover, in-house counsel were quite
muted in their criticisms of corporate executives, depicting managerial
litigiousness as being, at most, a rare aberration. On the whole, the
amoral, short-sighted, hyperaggressive client was virtually absent from
this alternative account. Such differences in perception between inhouse and outside counsel will be addressed at greater length below.
With regard to the ethics of lawyer-client relations, however, the primary impact was to make in-house counsel vocal partisans of the litigator-as-agent model. Whereas even the most agentically-oriented
large-firm litigators voiced this position in tones of resignation, most
inside counsel affirmatively embraced the placement of moral decision-making squarely within the corporation-preferably in an interaction between themselves and their executive superiors. In this view,
in-house attorneys have ample moral sensitivity to produce ethical litigation strategies, and executives have ample rationality to recognize
when aggression would be pragmatically unwise. Although outside
lawyers may occasionally be useful as sounding boards, in general,
they only cloud the moral and managerial issues with their own pecu-
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niary interests in generating billable hours. Therefore, the most ethical stance for outside counsel would be one of agentic deferencewith the locus of fiduciary counseling moving entirely in-house.
Since the tension between agentic and fiduciary roles is one of the
most celebrated and longstanding issues in legal ethics, 2 the divergence between outside and inside counsel represents a significant, albeit under-acknowledged, schism in the profession's internal moral
climate. Not only do inside counsel question the proposition that
outside attorneys should have significant counseling obligations, but
they also appear to question the larger ideology that links professional
autonomy with moral objectivity. From the in-house counsel's perspective, outside attorneys' non-agentic ethical concerns are, at best,
redundant with the in-house counsel's own moral stewardship-and,
at worst, subversive of the very principle of client control. Since
outside lawyers do not need to worry about corporate clients' ethics,
doing so amounts to either an unethical waste of resources or an unethical attempt at manipulation. Needless to say, even when they advocate an agentic posture, large-firm litigators see the issue quite
differently.
Without further research, it is hard to know whether this schism
between inside and outside counsel is a longstanding condition, or
whether instead the in-house bar has only recently begun to question3
the assumption that independence yields superior moral judgment1
In any case, though, as in-house legal departments grow and become
increasingly powerful, their distinctive ideological claims become an
important part of the moral universe of corporate litigation-for corporate clients and for large-firm litigators alike.
Ethical Pragmatism in Systemic Relations
The final level of normative obligation-duty to the larger social
system-surfaced primarily in informants' comments on the linkage
between discovery practice and the courts. Although judges repeatedly emphasized that discovery is supposed to serve a systemic objective of truth-seeking, to a striking extent, litigators (and judges as
well) described actual discovery practice in the language of adversarial
gamesmanship, as a highly stylized competition in which each side
could be counted upon to employ a fairly predictable repertoire of
maneuvers. In this game, deception and diversion are both normal
22. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 18, at 35 (examining how the different roles
lawyers play affect their moral decisions).
23. Robert Rosen reports substantial deference by corporate in-house counsel to
the moral judgments of outside attorneys. See Robert E. Rosen, Lawyers in Corporate Decision Making (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California
(Berkeley)) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Assuming that this orientation
was widespread at the time, the much less deferential attitudes revealed in the present
study may, indeed, be a relatively recent development.
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and normative. Thus, for most large-firm litigators, the ethics of the
lawyer-court relationship revolve not around the morality of the game
itself-or even around the morality of winning a case on strategy
rather than on the merits-but rather around the legitimacy or illegitimacy of particular tactics within the game's official and unofficial
rules.

Here, informants seemed to operate within a fairly well-defined hierarchy of obligation, ranging from the genuinely moral to the narrowly ethical to the purely pragmatic. In defending depositions, for
example, instructing one's witness to lie was almost universally condemned as a serious moral lapse-a "cardinal sin," as one informant
put it.24 Instructing one's witness not to answer was also seen as morally improper (and at least one defense firm had an explicit policy
against it), but here the impropriety rose only to the level of a "venial
sin" or a "rules violation." Making speaking objections and/or conferring with the witness during questioning was recognized as a violation
of court rules (and, hence, as arguably "unethical"), but the relevant
rules were generally seen as artificial constraints, to be construed as
narrowly as pragmatically possible. Finally, conferring with one's witness during rest breaks was seen as an affirmative moral obligationeven in jurisdictions where the courts had promulgated rules formally
prohibiting it.
Judging from the emphasis of our informants' comments, the bulk
of deposition defense falls into the middle ground of speaking objections, conferences during questioning, and strategic requests for "rest
24. Although attorneys clearly felt that suborning perjury was beyond the ethical
and moral pale (and pragmatically self-defeating, as well), many went quite far in
briefing witnesses on the case, before hearing their proposed testimony. As one
large-firm partner remarked, without apparent irony, "You are aware of the psychological impact, but that's not the purpose, because you do it for everybody."
While it is tempting to see this as either incredible naivetd or cynical formalism,
other comments suggest a more complex interpretation. In many ways, litigation
practice involves constructing a consistent and plausible narrative that serves as a
simulacrum for an inherently unknowable "truth." See Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra
and Simulation 1 (Shelia Faria Glaser trans., 1994). This "Story of the Case" emerges
only gradually, but by the time depositions have begun, "The Story" has taken on a
reality that is prior to and independent of any particular testimony. Spontaneitywhether honest or dishonest, helpful or harmful-is therefore dangerous, because
statements that are disconnected from "The Story" threaten the attorney's cognitive
control. Telling "The Story" to a witness before hearing his or her testimony isn't
suborning perjury, because "The Story" is the attorney's best approximation of Truth.
Anything consistent with "The Story" is, at worst, honest "spin," and anything inconsistent is, at best, confused recollection. Encouraging the former and discouraging the
latter serves, rather than violates, the attorney's duty as an officer of the court.
While this mindset may seem implausible to a layperson, it helps to explain how
attorneys can justify "aggressive" witness preparation. It also sheds a somewhat more
favorable light on efforts to intervene in a deposition after the witness has offered
testimony contradicting "The Story." As "one associate noted, the attorney's interruption may be motivated less by a desire to obscure a potentially damaging revelation
than by a desire to clarify a potentially misleading inconsistency.
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breaks." In these maneuvers,5 ethical pragmatism translates into a
"gaming" of the formal rules. As one partner put it (with perceptible pride), "It's interesting what you can do under the guise of clarification." At several points, attorneys even suggested that the sin of
instructing a witness not to answer a legitimate question may be morally justifiable in extreme circumstances-much as the sin of pass interference in a football game may be justifiable when it prevents an
otherwise sure touchdown. The logic seems to be that if a rule violation does not contradict the basic premise of the game, then it should
be seen as an integral part of the game, an option to be employed
instrumentally when the balance of strategic payoffs and sanction
threats make it pragmatically worthwhile.26
The Sound of Silence
Before proceeding, it is perhaps worth noting that the ethical/moral/
pragmatic comments summarized above leave several potential obligations unaddressed. Thus, for example, our informants exhibited little sense of moral duty to the well-being of the larger legal system.
Perhaps because they saw themselves as subordinate to the courts, the
informants seemed to perceive little chance that their pragmatic gaming would undercut the administration of justice (at least as long as
they avoided full-blown deception or extreme obstructionism). To the
extent that these attorneys accepted moral responsibility for discovery
practices, it was primarily responsibility for acting civilly toward their
opposing counterpart and for giving good counsel to their lay client.
The court, like a parent, was seen as providing moral constraint, but
not as needing moral protection. This parental imagery was echoed in
judges' comments as well. While some informants expressed concern
that attorney behavior might subvert the pursuit of justice in particu25. Significantly, some of these activities simultaneously drew approval (or at least

acceptance) as litigation tactics and opprobrium as intra-professional incivility. Ethical deposition defense, it seems, involves skirting the constraints of the larger legal
system with enough finesse that one does not step on opposing counsel's toes in the
process.
26. Although the sessions with plaintiffs' attorneys, judges, and in-house counsel
did not dwell at length on the topic of deposition practice, nothing emerged from
these groups that significantly contradicted the account provided by the large-firm
litigators. Plaintiffs' attorneys simultaneously decried some defense tactics (such as
excessively incessant objections) and introduced some dubious tactics of their own
(such as imposing inconvenient deposition schedules in order to break down executives' elitist sense of invulnerability); however, their understanding of the tacit "rules
of the game" seemed roughly congruent with that of the defense attorneys. Judges,
for their part, vociferously denounced the prevalence of gamesmanship on both sides;
however, they generally depicted this gamesmanship as a failure of institutional enforcement mechanisms, rather than as an ethical lapse on the part of the attorneys. In
fact, judges' complaints about the difficulty of sanctioning run-of-the-mill game-playing attest to the existence of consensually-defined tacit rules that make such adversarial maneuvers informally (if not formally) legitimate.
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lar cases, few expressed concern that it would corrupt the justice system as a whole.
Equally significant, informants had little to say about obligations to
the well-being of the legal profession (in contrast to specific colleagues and adversaries); obligations to the well-being of third-party
witnesses and other non-professional bystanders (in contrast to clients); and obligations to the well-being of the larger society (in contrast to the justice system, alone).2 7 The fact that these beneficiaries
are not particularly salient in litigators' moral reasoning may help to
explain the suspicion and hostility that the legal profession often encounters in its interactions with the general public.
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AT THREE LEVELS

In addition to describing the normative rules governing particular
aspects of practice, informants spent a substantial amount of time discussing the factors supporting or undercutting "good behavior" in the
profession. For convenience, we can divide these into three levels of
analysis: individual-level factors, firm-level factors, and system-level
factors.
Individual-level Factors
Just as respondents were quick to say that most ethical decisions
rested on situational judgments ("it depends"), they were equally
quick to point out that the outcome of such decisions rested on individual personality. In particular, the "asshole attorney" repeatedly
emerged as a taken-for-granted personality type, with the primary social-structural question being simply whether such miscreants clustered in specific social locations. Rather than seeing social structure
as a cause of ethically problematic behavior, informants tended to attribute causation to pre-existing character flaws and tended to see social structure merely as a contingency that might or might not allow
such traits to come to the fore. In the words of a large-firm associate,
ethical failings reflect the fact that:
You have jerks . . . who are occasionally rewarded for aggression.... You get some really aggressive, smart people who are tremendously egotistical, and who have a lot to prove, and who have
client relationships to foster, and who want to be great guys-and
they will play to the edge, and sometimes they go over it.
27. None of the focus groups dwelled on these topics at great length. Nonetheless,
compared to large-firm litigators, judges and plaintiffs' attorneys seemed somewhat

more concerned about the image of the legal profession and about the needs of society, at least rhetorically if not in their daily practices. In-house counsel, for their part,
seemed somewhat more willing to discuss the treatment of third-party bystanders,
especially if this category is seen as including corporate personnel who are not the
direct targets of a complaint.
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Nonetheless, while ethical lapses may, in fact, stem from individuallevel personality, the evidence from the focus groups also suggests
some grounds for caution. Among other things, the "personalities" of
several informants actually seemed to move back and forth along the
aggressiveness continuum over the course of the two weekends. As
one large-firm partner put it, "Nice guys can be shifty." Thus, for example, one associate, commenting on the first weekend that she routinely opens discovery by volunteering to waive interrogatories and
forswear hard-ball tactics, indicated on the second weekend that she
has no qualms about diverting a deposition with unwarranted objections-"if they fall for it, do it." Facially inconsistent practices like
these suggest that "asshole" behavior may be as much a product of the
situation as of the person.
In this regard, one persistent theme that emerged in large-firm litigators' discussions of deposition defense was a sense that "walking the
line" was the morally preferred position for the responsible attorney.
When these informants told deposition war stories, an ability to push
the ethical envelope represented a source of substantial professional
pride, rather than an embarrassing confession of susceptibility to
temptation. Their comments indicated no ethical "safe zone" lying
well within the limits of the rules: cautious punctiliousness was at
least as ethically troubling as venturesome zeal.
Arguably, the origins of this orientation lie in the adversarial ethos
that most large-firm litigators repeatedly espoused: just as the Hippocratic Oath directs physicians to "first, do no harm," the unspoken
norms of the legal profession instruct the litigator to "first, zealously
serve your client." While it is tempting to treat this doctrine as being
at best an all-purpose fallback, and at worst a disingenuous excuse for
abdicating moral responsibility, our informants seemed to experience
it as being much more substantive and compulsory than this. Zealous
advocacy was, to them, an affirmative moral obligation, even when it
came into conflict with other ethical rules. As one large-firm partner
observed with regard to defending depositions, "An attorney isn't expected to stay away from these lines and leave the witness out there
alone ....

You don't feel you're doing your job without speaking

objections."
So the litigator is like a tightrope walker, trying to tread the line
between a moral obligation to play by the rules and an equally moral
obligation to protect the client. To use the language of the previous
section: extra-professional advocacy obligations to the client, intraprofessional comity obligations to opposing counsel, and systemic investigatory obligations to the court all interact to create a set of crosscutting constraints. Deviation from the line in either direction is an
ethical failure, and a cause for embarrassment. Indeed, one of the
most senior partners actually blushed beet-red when recounting how
youthful arrogance had led him to "step over the line" once, more
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than three decades ago. Moreover, the formal sanctioning regime actively reinforces this sense that the good attorney walks the ethical
borderline. The legal system imposes monetary punishments not only
for excessive aggressiveness, but also (under the guise of malpractice)
for excessive caution.
Ironically, these crosscutting structural forces may actually increase
the sense that ethicality is an individual personality trait. Unable to
rest squarely inside the ethical boundary, the litigator must perch on a
very fine perimeter and grapple with "surprise" pressures from multiple directions (including from all the large-firm litigator's "usual suspects": uncivil plaintiffs' attorneys; amoral, fair-weather clients;
hyperaggressive mid-level partners; under-socialized lateral hires;
petty, intrusive in-house counsels; and lazy, remote judges). Success
in holding this perch may depend as much on "personal" characteristics like balance, judgment, agility, and composure as "contextual"
characteristics like the severity of the punishment for slipping off.
Clearly, this analysis portrays litigators' individual-level behaviors
in a relatively sympathetic light, and one could certainly formulate a
more critical alternative account. Nonetheless, there is sound empirical and theoretical reason to believe that most people try to do what
they believe is morally right, most of the time.2 Given this, one
should hardly be surprised when actors describe their ethical lapses as
having been forced upon them by a catch-22 of competing constraints
or by a conspiracy of diabolical outside forces. Of course, one should
also not be surprised when those "outside forces" describe their own
behavior as having been equally forced upon them. And, indeed, this
is largely what we found in our conversations with large-firm litigators' favorite villains-a point to which I will return below.
The Changing Macro-Structureof Legal Practice
To the extent that the self-exculpatory beliefs of large-firm litigators, plaintiffs' attorneys, in-house counsel, and judges are all
"true," understanding ethical breakdowns may require a shift of focus
to a more macroscopic level of analysis. To understand such macrostructural influences on litigation practice, it is important to recognize
that the legal profession has undergone two distinct but interrelated
transitions in recent years. The first is "marketization"; the second,
"bureaucratization."
Marketization refers to an increasing exposure of elite law firms to
competitive pressures.29 Although the precise causes of this transition
28. See James G. March, Decision Making Perspective: Decisions in Organizations and Theories of Choice, in Perspectives on Organization Design and Behavior
205, 205-37 (Adrew H. Van de Ven & William F. Joyce eds., 1981).
29. Prior research suggests that less-elite lawyers have long experienced more in-

tense economic competition than currently confronts even the most marketized portions of the bar's upper strata. See, eg., Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers on Their Own: A
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remain debatable, several historical developments have almost certainly played a part. Since the 1970s, courts have struck down restrictions on professional advertising,3 0 a new breed of legal journalism has
begun to report on law firm management and earnings, 3' and legal
labor markets have fluctuated significantly, producing periods of both
over- and under-supply. 3 Perhaps most importantly, many corporate
clients have responded to rising legal costs by augmenting their inhouse counsel's offices, making these companies into unprecedentedly
informed consumers of professional services. 33 One in-house counsel
described the new regime as follows:
When I got into our company, nobody reviewed the legal bills; they
just got paid. Since we were paying millions and millions of dollars
every year, I didn't like that idea.... Lawyers need to face the fact
that today with more than 850,000 lawyers in this country there are
an enormous number of top-quality litigators who love doing trial
work, and who will do it for relatively low cost. I've told partners
very directly that one of our objectives is to lower your annual
income.
Another in-house attorney's comments illuminate the resulting increase in "comparison shopping":
I don't want to pay $500 an hour for [legal] services, and there are a
lot of high-quality lawyers around. I had one case on the East Coast
where I decided to have the bulk of the work done in Texas, because the law firm I was using there charged half the hourly rate,
just straight across the board. And the partners were excellent, the
associates were top-notch. If I have general legal research questions, frequently I call Houston now. I don't go to Philadelphia,
Wilmington, or New York.
In addition to breaking down ongoing "retainer" relationships between law firms and their clients, this commodification of legal services has also influenced the relationships among outside attorneys
themselves. With clients increasingly "hiring lawyers, not firms," inter-firm career mobility has risen, and lateral recruitment has become
a familiar feature of the professional landscape.3 4 Thus, firms are now
Study of Individual Practitioners in Chicago 115-16 (1962) (concluding that over 40%
of low-level practitioners and less than 20% of upper-level lawyers experienced
competition).
30. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigms

in Studies of the Legal Profession, in Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices 1, 12 (R.
Nelson et al. eds., 1992).

31. Id. at 9-10.

32. Richard H. Sander & Douglas Williams, Why Are There So Many Lawyers?
Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 L. & Soc. Inquiry 431, 464-67, 471-73 (1989).
33. See, e.g., Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 281 (proposing that "corporations
are ... in a far better position to accomplish business goals in a legally optimized

manner with effective inside counsel than without").

34. Since law firms often recruit mid-career partners as "rainmakers," cultural synecdoche appears to have made lateral hiring into an almost mythical symbol for the
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competing with one another for the transitory loyalties of partners, as
well as of clients. Moreover, there are few signs that the marketization trend will stop here. As an in-house counsel observed:
It's not going to get any easier. The competition isn't between Law
Firm A and Law Firm B. One of my missions in life is to try never
to use the lead firm's paralegals any more. My number two goal is
to subcontract out my legal research, and to get to a point where
we're going to hire temporary lawyers to do routine tasks. [Large
firms are] going to face a major unbundling of their marketable
services. They think we shouldn't be doing that. I guess I can understand their complaint, but that's what's going on.
Alongside this marketization of professional practice, elite lawyers
are also experiencing a significant bureaucratization of their professional workplaces. As documented, the size of the nation's leading
law firms has grown dramatically in recent decades. 5 With very few
exceptions, elite outside counsel (including virtually all of our informants) now work in "partnerships" of literally hundreds of attorneys,
often spread among offices in several states or even countries. Moreover, although the upper echelons of the legal profession are still disproportionately white and male, they have become significantly more
heterogeneous than they once were.36 As law firms grow and diversify, informal social structures and face-to-face contacts no longer suffice to bind these organizations together, and a new regime of formal
hierarchy, record-keeping, and evaluation has slowly begun to
emerge. At the same time, outside of elite firms, attorneys are increasingly practicing in other highly bureaucratized settings as well,
including business corporations, government agencies,
mass-market
37
legal service chains, and rationalized court systems.
marketization process as a whole. Certainly, in our informants' comments, laterals
received a degree of blame for the ethical state of the profession that was far out of
proportion to their likely influence. Interestingly, in an interim presentation to the
American Bar Association's annual meeting, the research team polled the audience
and found a virtually even split on the question of whether lateral hires exert a negative impact on large-firm ethics. Responses, however, correlated closely to whether
respondents had, themselves, made a lateral career move-with over 80% of the nonmovers adopting a critical stance.
35. See Galanter & Palay, Tournament of Lawyers, supra note 3, at 46; Marc Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United States, in The
Sociology of the Professions: Lawyers, Doctors and Others 152, 153-55 (Robert
Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983); Galanter & Palay, Wiy the Big Get Bigger,supra
note 3, at 749.
36. Cf. Heinz & Laumann, supra note 1, at 10-11 (noting the increasing number of
women and minorities among young Chicago Lawyers); Erwin 0. Smigel, The Vall
Street Lawyer 44-47 (1964) (highlighting the traditional barriers in Wail Street firms
for women and minoritities).
37. See generally Wolf Heydebrand & Carroll Seron, Rationalizing Justice: The
Political Economy of Federal District Courts 134-44 (1990) (stating that the increasing
bureaucratization of the federal justice system has resulted in a technocratic administration of justice); Jerry Van Hoy, Franchise Law Firms and the Transformation of
Personal Legal Services 2-5 (1997) (discussing the rise of mass market law firms and
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Thus, at a macroscopic level, the modern legal profession is experiencing an unprecedented degree of both commodification and supervisory control. Not surprisingly, the repercussions of these changes
echoed through our informants' comments, sometimes with positive
overtones, but usually with regret. In the absence of further research,
it is, of course, impossible to determine whether the commentary that
we heard was either an accurate description of empirical conditions or
a hyperbolic evocation of intra-professional mythology. In either
case, though, the image of a profession increasingly subordinated to
both markets and hierarchies clearly constituted a central component
of our informants' world views."' In explaining the ethical state of the
profession, these macro-structural images manifested themselves at
two levels of analysis: the individual law firm and the legal system as a
whole.
Firm-level Factors
All of the focus-group discussions among large-firm litigators devoted a substantial amount of attention to ways in which law firm
structure might promote or undermine ethical litigation practices.
The observations elicited by these conversations were rich and diverse. To provide a framework for interpreting this material, the present section subdivides informants' comments into: (a) observations
about material controls within the firm; (b) observations about cultural controls within the firm; and (c) observations about changes in
these control mechanisms in light of lager transformations in the social organization of the profession.
Broadly speaking, organizations (including law firms) possess two
main means of control over their members: material incentives and
cultural beliefs. Participants in the large-firm focus groups spent quite
a bit of time discussing material factors; however, a dispassionate
analysis would almost certainly conclude that the formal material controls on ethicality in these firms are remarkably weak. Although these
are some of the most structurally-elaborated firms in the country, they
its effect on the delivery of legal services); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 1, at 277-78
(noting the increasing importance of in-house counsel and its effect on law firms);
Spangler & Lehman, supra note 1, at 63-99 (discussing the work and practice structures of the American legal profession).
38. Readers familiar with organizational economics may note an apparent contradiction in the claim that the "governance" of legal transactions has become, simultaneously, both more market-like and more hierarchical. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson,
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 73-74 (1985) (noting that market governance
controls most nonspecific transactions types). This situation is only contradictory,
however, if one subscribes to a rigid view of the markets-versus-hierarchies opposition as an all-encompassing partition of the universe of governance structures. In fact,
what has happened in the practice of law is that loose "professional" governance,
based on reputational networks and internalized norms, has begun to give way to
more formal capitalistic regimes: markets for some types of transactions, and administrative bureaucracies for others.
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conduct very little routine ethical evaluation, and they possess few
mechanisms for incorporating ethical information (were it available)
into the allocation of material rewards. Most of the firms' sanctioning
regimes are premised on "exceptional case response," and yet the
structures for identifying and reporting response-worthy cases are
either nonexistent or marginalized. As several informants noted,
judges rarely impose sanctions for discovery abuse, and in the absence
of such external alerts, most sharp practices remain virtually invisible
to the firm as a whole. In theory, firms might compensate for judicial
passivity through active internal monitoring; however, there was little
evidence of this, even among those firms that professed strong ethical
sensibilities. One associate's comments captured the irony of the
situation:
I've worked at two firms, and I think that in both firms, certainly,
you would be encouraged to bring anything that you felt was a clear
problem to the right place-although, quite frankly, I couldn't tell
you what the right place was, in either one of those firms, because
they didn't designate anyone in particular, to my knowledge.
Moreover, even if occasional ethical failures do come to light, few
firms offer clear micro-to-macro feedback loops for examining the
overall pattern of problem-cases and for formulating general policy
responses.
At best, the material control structures in these firms provide symbolic enactments of the abstract cultural principle that "ethicality matters to people like us," but it seems unlikely that any of these
attorneys could fear serious material repercussions for anything but
the most egregious of ethical failures.39 In the language of organizational theory, the formal structures in our informants' firms seem better designed for ceremonial conformityl0 than for organizational
learning;4 ' "[a]ppropriate" controls exist in the abstract, but in reality
they turn out to be almost entirely decoupled from daily practice. Instead, firms operate on the basis of a "logic of confidence":42 the
firm's ethical health is "confirmed" by the absence of negative feedback from control structures that have been allowed to atrophy precisely because of a belief that the firm is too ethically healthy to really
need them.
Significantly, the weakness of formal material controls may partly
reflect these firms' allegiance to a particular ideology of autonomous
professionalism. For many informants, professional collegiality
39. It is even clearer that none of our attorneys saw anything to be gained in their
firm's compensation and promotion process from exceptionally high ethical conduct.
40. See John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 Am. J. Soc. 340, 340-41 (1977).
41. See Barbara Levitt & James G. March, Organization Learning, 14 Ann. Rev.
Soc. 319, 319-340 (1988).
42. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 40, at 357-58.
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seemed incompatible with close supervisory control of day-to-day activities. Although associates often expressed a desire for more ethical
guidance (see below), they also prided themselves on having earned
enough trust to manage matters on their own. Partners, for their part,
expressed quite a bit of ambivalence about whether formal ethical
control was the firm's responsibility at all. As one partner put it,
"How would you do it? Deposition police? These are senior guys
working on their own matters." Another added, "Applying standards
of decency is hard when you are dealing with adults and fellow
partners."
The absence of systematic ethical control is further supported by
other aspects of professional ideology which play up the case-by-case
nature of practice and which take a skeptical view of scientific rationalization.43 A large-firm associate's comments suggest that ethical enforcement is hardly the only area in which law firms fail to recognize
linkages between individual instances: "It's amazing how inefficient
large law firms are. I had a client say, 'Boy, I just paid such and such,
X amount of time, to research this very thing.' We duplicate research
and reinvent the wheel-even for the same client." In this sense, the
weakness of ethical feedback loops is simply another manifestation of
the individualized, disaggregated, unrationalized, anecdotal character
of legal practice in general.
Of course, this does not mean that large law firms are entirely devoid of effective evaluation-and-reward structures. Indeed, while
large-firm attorneys may reject ethical evaluation as being unprofessional and demeaning, other types of evaluation are quite commonplace. Unfortunately, many of these incentive systems seem to be
actively working againstpeak ethicality. When large firm informants
were asked to propose firm-level changes that would promote ethical
practice, many of their suggestions involved abolishing counterproductive structures, not enhancing beneficial ones. Among the culprits: billing pressures (including the use of billable hours as an allpurpose performance measure), competitive compensation, emphasis
on rainmaking, and the favorable treatment of aggressiveness in evaluation. As one associate suggested-to make a more ethical law firm,
simply "don't promote jerks."
The general sense seemed to be that, despite official policy statements, most firms were designed to reward behavior that was at best
unrelated to ethicality, and at worst destructive of it. In the words of
one senior associate: "Being perceived as being aggressive in defending the client's interest will get me ahead in the law firm, get me on
the cases that I want to be on and in the position that I want to be in."
Another associate elaborated:
43. Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993) (describing the crisis that modern lawyers face as the "lawyer-statesman" ideal declines).
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I have the perception that if one is reasonable and perhaps even
likable and cordial to an adversary (as I'd like to think I am), that
this is perceived as a weakness by some mid-level partners. They
don't understand why you give [opposing counsel] pleasantries during depositions-"Why don't we threaten them with sanctions?!?"
You're viewed as being somehow soft or something. I feel that my
style, which I like to think is a little more reasonable and pragmatic,
is looked at as being weak or less-than-aggressive.

Although few attorneys saw their firms as being well-constructed
for enforcing ethicality through material incentives, many professed
much more faith in the adequacy of the second major control mechanism, firm culture. Organizational sociologists have identified three
major sources of organizational culture-selection, socialization, and
interaction-and to some extent, informants reported that their firms
employ all three.' It is not clear, however, whether any of these
mechanisms are sufficiently well-developed to produce truly effective
cultural control.4 5

Large-firm selection procedures focus primarily on recruiting "people like us." New associates are drawn from the "better" law schools,
and they pass through a winnowing process of interviews, summer
programs, performance reviews and, eventually, promotion to partner.
The role of ethicality in this winnowing, however, remains unclear.
Since law firms have few opportunities to observe new attorneys' litigation ethics in action, and since lateral hires are chosen primarily for
their rainmaking potential, it seems likely that the moral components
of selection focus almost entirely on intra-professional conviviality
within the firm. Thus, the selection regime increases the likelihood
that a firm's attorneys will share a common set of manners and common standards of civility, but it may not ensure that they will be particularly ethical in their litigation practices.
44. See generally Organizational Culture (Peter J. Frost et al. eds., 1985) (discussing the development of the study of organizational culture); Refraining Organizational Culture (Peter J.Frost et al. eds., 1991) (same); Harrison M. Trice & Janice M.
Breyer, The Cultures of Work Organizations (1993) (discussing the cultural processes
of modem work organization).
45. This point was not lost on our informants. Although firm culture was frequently cited as the ultimate guarantor of ethicality, its nature (and even its existence)
remained a matter of some ambivalence. On the one hand, most large-firm informants professed faith in their firm's culture, and most judges, plaintiffs' attorneys, and
in-house counsel claimed to be able to draw meaningful distinctions among these
firms. On the other hand, few informants could articulate the details of their own
firm's culture, and several suggested that growth and diversification rendered firm
culture largely a thing of the past. Among the skeptics, opinions varied regarding
where behavioral norms were now institutionalized-at the level of individual personalities, at the level of intra-firm practice groups, at the level of city-wide legal communities, or at the level of practice specialties within the larger bar. Equally important,
even the informants who argued for the existence of firm culture split over the adequacy of such culture in producing ethical behavior.
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Perhaps more important than selection is socialization. Certainly,
this aspect of culture-building generated substantial discussion in the
litigator focus groups. In general, although formal training programs
received frequent mention, attorneys cited informal day-to-day contacts between associates and partners as providing the primary socialization forum in most firms. The following associate's-eye view was
typical:
You walk down the halls to the partner or to an associate who's a
little more senior than yourself and you say, "Geez, I've got these
interrogatories; have you ever done anything like this before?" "Oh
yeah, I've got something from a case called blankety blank. Why
don't you go look in that file?" Then you go through a drafting
process where you actually haggle over the language, and in that
process, you learn what sorts of things you're supposed to be doing-"how we do it here"-and also you've looked at what other
people have written. And that's how the knowledge of the lawyer
trickles down.
Significantly, however, associates were much less satisfied with the
current training regime than were partners. When asked to list important or distinctive things that their firms did to promote ethics, over
half the partners identified either formal or informal socialization
mechanisms, and only one partner saw a need to increase such efforts.
Presented with this sanguine assessment, associates expressed substantial dismay; on their own list of policy changes, improving socialization played a much more central role. In particular, associates
voiced concern about the fact that most training activities were concentrated in the very early stages of their careers, before they had
enough relevant experience to raise hard questions (and before they
had bad habits to correct). They also complained that formal ethical
training tended to neglect day-to-day issues, and that it provided insufficient guidance in dealing with the sharp practices of opponents.
This-criticism seemed most prevalent in connection with courses provided by professional bodies outside the firm. A relatively senior associate captured the tenor of many of these concerns:
When I was new, we had many more in-house seminars on ethical
dilemmas and what you should do about them. Now that we have
[an externally-imposed Continuing Legal Education requirement],
as the time goes by, we don't have those in-house seminars anymore. That is a little bit of a problem, because it is very hard, in my
opinion, to find ABA ethics classes that actually speak to somebody
who faces the dilemmas that I face. For example, I am a mid-level
associate. I have just started now dealing with expert witnesses ....
It would be really useful for me if somebody were to give a seminar
on the ethical dilemmas that I might face and how to deal with
those, but the ABA and the [State Bar Association] don't seem to
have that, and it's something my firm is not providing.
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It is also worth noting that, while large-firm associates felt that in-

formal role-modeling was generally more effective than formal instruction, they did not necessarily feel that the most commonly
modeled behaviors were particularly conducive to ethical practice.
Said one, in regard to the Fisons vignette:
You're taught these things when you walk into the firm. You're
taught to be aggressive and to not just hand things over. The attitude is almost that they have to rip it out of your hands, otherwise
we're going to build up all sorts of road blocks ....

At my firm,

from the time I was a baby associate in my first couple of weeks,
I've had a number of partners who've said, "This document

.

..

-

it's absolutely nothing. It's the employment application or something! ...

This document was not specifically called for, so we're

not going to produce it." Certainly, the aggressive attitude was
communicated in those kinds of situations.
Added another: "I think that you learn by osmosis. The first time I
had to draft a response to interrogatories, I went and looked at other
people's responses, and I found out that there was a sort of canned,
standard response-which was to object to everything in sight."
Despite these complaints about weaknesses in socialization, however, informants' greatest concerns seemed to center on the third leg
of the cultural triad: interaction. In most social settings, culture is
elaborated through informal dialogue and reinforced by formal ceremony. The large modem law firm, however, faces obstacles in both
regards. In their comments, most large-firm attorneys depicted themselves as working alone-or, at best, as participating in a department
or practice group that comprised only a small subset of the firm as a
whole. Asked how they would reform their firms to improve ethical
standards, many proposed gathering firm members together, in one
way or another, to share experiences and compare practices. Associates, in particular, conveyed a profound sense of isolation and a genuine craving for supportive direction. Although they frequently talked
about clearing discovery tactics wvith supervising partners, their reform
proposals revealed a pervasive desire for more vibrant ethical dialogue in the firm as a whole. Prominent among these recommendations were changes in informal interaction, such as: "Talk about ethics
at section meetings," "make more effort to communicate norms,"
"create a culture where there's comfort with raising ethical issues,"
and "treat associates as lawyers, not as hired help." As one associate
put it, "Our suggestions are a cry for guidance."
Moreover, in many large firms, the existing repertory of cultural
ceremonies-like the repertory of material incentives-occasionally
works against the development of ethical culture. Thus, for example,
several comments hinted that the daily rituals of tracking workloads
serve to symbolically exclude ethical discussion from the firm's core
activities. When firms make billable hours a key evaluation device (as
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our informants' firms clearly have), billing procedures become not just
a way of allocating material incentives, but also a way of indicating
which aspects of professional life "count." This, presumably, was the
motivation behind one associate's suggestion that firms should create
a billing number for "time spent in ethical give and take," and, in a
different way, it may have also influenced another associate's suggestion that ethical feedback be separated from the evaluation process,
where it currently gets drowned out by productivity concerns. In
short, in a setting where the Ethics Committee is known as the "No
Business Committee," the routine ceremonies of business production
can inadvertently convey the symbolic message that ethical consultation is just one step above napping at one's desk.
Before leaving the law-firm level of analysis, it is perhaps worth
noting that most informants perceived the firm-level situation to be
worsening, rather than improving. As described above, recent years
have seen a significant reorganization of legal practice, and large-firm
informants expressed dismay at the impact that this transition has had
on the ability of their firms to serve as ethical control structures. The
most frequently-mentioned threat was an increasingly cost-conscious,
decreasingly loyal clientele, which will no longer subsidize apprenticeship, socialization, or indulge ethical back-talk. The growth of inhouse counsel offices ostensibly exacerbates this trend, by creating, in
essence, a legally-trained yes-staff that undercuts outside counsel's
moral authority and constrains outside counsel's operational autonomy. Firms, for their part, capitulate to this new regime by basing
promotion and recruitment on rainmaking ability, rather than on affinity with the firm's ethical culture. Informants harshly criticized lateral hires in this regard; although it was unclear whether the critique
was that: (a) the type of person who would seek lateral mobility is, by
nature, asocial, mercenary, and hyper-aggressive, or (b) laterals are no
less thoroughly socialized than other attorneys, but because they have
received their socialization elsewhere, their arrival inevitably "frays"
the hiring firm's cultural coherence.
Large-firm informants also expressed misgivings about the increasing bureaucratization of their law firms. Several informants, for example, indicated that a firm's larger size brings a greater reliance on
formal versus informal control, and on material versus cultural control. They also indicated that size heightens the risk of isolation on
the part of individual attorneys, practice groups, or departments, and,
when coupled with geographical dispersion, it increases the potential
for cultural heterogeneity. As one associate observed:
I've worked with two firms, and in the less hierarchical-the much
smaller-firm, there was a much more open flow of information.
You feel more free and capable of speaking your mind, and you're
less intimidated about speaking to someone who is the head of your
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department or the head of your firm. In a larger firm, which is more
hierarchical by nature, there are more barriers.
Admittedly, growth also often increases financial stability, and several
informants suggested that this can have a positive impact on ethicality.
"Those who can afford ethics do it," said one large firm partner.
However, much of this gain can be absorbed by higher compensation
expectations and by the growing firm's insatiable hunger for new
business.4 6

Interestingly, organizational sociology suggests a counter-story regarding bureaucratization. In the classic rendition, bureaucracies
serve to impose hierarchical control on their lower echelons4 7 and to
buffer their technical cores from environmental pressures. 4s Arguably, both of these impulses have the potential to improve ethical behavior, particularly when hierarchical supervisors are themselves wellsocialized professionals and environmental pressures primarily come
from unsocialized lay clients. In addition, because of their greater visibility, large bureaucracies presumably have a greater stake in maintaining their sociopolitical legitimacy, thereby making them more
subject to reputational controls. None of these optimistic arguments,
however, surfaced in the comments of our lawyer informants. It is
hard to know whether this was due to practitioners' inability to disentangle the effects of marketization and bureaucratization, the theory's
insensitivity to unique features of the present situation,4 9 or the
bureaucratization of large law firms. It is clear, though, that at the
present juncture, few of our large-firm informants see either marketization or bureaucratization as representing a positive development
for professional ethics.
On the whole, then, the picture that emerges at the law firm level is
one in which the nature of the practice has shifted dramatically, but
the ethical controls on practice have remained almost unchanged.
46. Given our informants' misgivings about growth, it is interesting to note that
they were virtually unanimous in their endorsement of the claim that large firms are
more ethical (or at least more "civil") than small ones. In part, this may reflect a
conflation of size and financial security. But to a large extent, it probably reflects the
fact that when ethicality is reduced to a question of manners, it becomes quite easy
for large-firm attorneys to mistake their colleagues' socio-cultural similarity for moral
propriety. Viewing these firms from an outside perspective, plaintiffs' attorneys saw
them as "internally cannibalistic"-albeit in a polite, high-society way.
47. See Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology 196244 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946).
48. See James D. Thompson, Organizations in Action 19-23 (1967).
49. Bureaucracy, for example, tends to foster an impersonal environment and
compartmentalization, which may carry particularly adverse consequences for the
largely tacit ethics of elite law firms. In addition, if the decision makers at the head of
a bureaucratic firm are themselves less concerned about ethical issues than about
profitability, hierarchical control structures and environmental buffers will merely
amplify this tendency. Finally, reputation and visibility can cut both ways, especially if
firms come to believe that a "tough guy" image attracts clients and intimidates
opponents.
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Firms still rely on informal contact, professional collegiality, and cultural homogeneity to maintain high ethical standards; however, the
reality that they embody is one of isolation, hierarchical differentiation, cultural fragmentation, and increasingly cut-throat market
competition.
System-level Factors
Given that informants were ostensibly discussing professional ethics, rather than individual or firm ethics, it is interesting to note how
little direct attention they devoted to the role of the profession and
other system-level factors in constructing and supporting standards of
good practice. Nonetheless, the fact that both individual-level and
firm-level phenomena reside within a larger institutional framework
formed a running subtext to many of the discussions.
At the most basic level, one striking feature of our attorneys' comments was the extent to which they analyzed ethical dilemmas as issues of intra-professional miscommunication. Repeatedly, discovery
was framed as a semiotic ritual-an exchange of "significant gestures," in Mead's terminology 50-between two members of a single
"discourse community." 51 The measure of ethical conduct seemed to
be "did the attorney send an honest signal," not "did the attorney produce the relevant material." As a result, certain practices (such as
"opening the warehouse" in response to a demand for document production, or making a speaking objection in response to a deposition
question, or subtly reframing a discovery request in the process of
supplying an evasive answer) were considered more acceptable if they
were used as signs to opposing counsel than if they were used as impediments to the release of legitimately requested information. In the
words of one large-firm associate:
It's probably okay if you put your spin [on a discovery request] into
writing and make it obvious to the requestor that you're putting in
the spin and saying it outright. The problem is when people sort of
privately, passively put these spins on the request and don't state
that and don't make it explicit in their answer.
Relatedly, many informants (including some plaintiffs' attorneys)
interpreted the Fisons scenario not as an ethical lapse on the part of
the defense firm, but rather as a communication breakdown between
opposing attorneys-and, hence, as the product of unprofessional
conduct on both sides. A large-firm associate's comments were typical: "the lack of a reaction by the plaintiffs' attorneys to these responses borders on negligence. To just take these responses, and not
to see where they are going with this-I mean, there are a lot of red
50. See Mead, supra note 15, at 75-82.
51. See James P. Zappen, The Discourse Community in Scientific and Technical
Communication: Institutionaland Social Views, 19 J. Technical Writing 1, 1 (1989).
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flags that need responses." This did not seem to be merely a case of
blaming the victim. Rather, such reactions reflected a pervasive sense
that fluency in the symbolic vocabulary of the profession ranked at or
near the top of every litigator's list of moral obligations. As another
associate put it: "That may be the difference between whether a lay
person could do it or only someone who is part of the club-because
lay people wouldn't necessarily know that these are red flags."
The existence of system-level ethical understandings emerged in
other contexts, as well. Although they came from two different cities
and several different firms, large-firm litigators showed a substantial
amount of consensus on, for example, the hierarchy of sins in deposition defense. And even where they displayed disagreement, the debate was often limited to two distinct positions, with one in the clear
majority. Most large-firm attorneys favored literal rather than liberal
interpretation of discovery requests; most favored briefing potential
witnesses on the "story of the case" rather than passively accepting
their unbriefed testimony; most favored aggressive rather than restrained deposition defense; and most preferred to act as an agent of
their client's will, rather than adopting an assertive fiduciary stance.
For all the talk of ethics being a matter of individual personality, the
views that our focus groups presented were remarkably uniform.
Given informants' apparent tendency to see litigation behavior as a
conversation of significant gestures and to embrace a system-level
consensus on most ethical issues, it would hardly be surprising to find
that, over time, the normal tends to become the normative in litigation
practice. With a common gestural vocabulary and broad agreement
on central ethical standards, few informants seemed to feel that anything was seriously amiss in their practices, even in those areas (such
as deposition defense) where technical rule violations abound. If conveying clear messages is the highest ethical obligation, then universal
adoption of a particular gesture makes that gesture appropriate by
definition. In this sense, litigation ethics do not exist in the abstract,
but rather are constantly being constructed from litigators' day-to-day
routines. Standards of conduct come from neither individual attorneys nor from individual firms, but rather from the larger system of
the profession as a whole.
In addition to providing the content of litigation ethics, the larger
social system also provides many of the mechanisms for their enforcement. Several crucial sources of material and cultural controls reside
largely outside the boundaries of any individual law firm. On the material side, the most obvious such mechanism is professional reputation, which emerges primarily from firms' ongoing interactions with
one another. Because an image of ethicality can facilitate everything
from discovery efforts to settlement negotiations, reputational concerns (both personal and organizational) play a central role in the
logic of ethical pragmatism. Professional reputation, however, is not
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the only systemic source of material incentives. Other devices for
aligning morality and self-interest emerge from ongoing interactions
with external monitors, such as malpractice insurers and the judiciary.
These monitors can increase the cost of sharp practices not only directly (by raising premiums or imposing fines), but also indirectly (by
encouraging the adoption of internal control mechanisms). Even
when these monitors operate by motivating firm-level reforms, however, it is important to recognize that the resulting changes are products of the external environment as much as of the firm itself."
Similarly, a great deal of what appears to be firm-level culture may,
in fact, come from outside. As mentioned above, attorneys often turn
to external mirrors (both real and hypothetical) for insights into their
own identities. These mirrors include newspapers, juries, judges, and
other firms. Said one large-firm associate:
When I draft answers to discovery requests, I assume that at some
point they're going to be blown up on a piece of poster board and
shown to a jury, and I don't want to be embarrassed by it. And if
you sort of view every discovery request that way, you'll find that
you'll answer in a much more reasonable fashion.
Relatedly, a large-firm partner echoed a recurrent theme when he
noted, "I know very little about my partners, except what I hear from
other firms." Thus, the "looking-glass self"53 large-firm culture is
largely a construct of the intra-professional environment.
Moreover, recent changes in the structure of practice may actually
be increasing the extent to which "firm culture" is, in reality, exogenous. Most obviously, laterals bring their socialization with them,
rather than receiving it within the firm. But in an era when associates
often work in isolation, even "home-grown" attorneys may, in effect,
be raised by wolves. More than one informant commented that he or
she had learned important deposition skills primarily by observing opposing counsel. The same, presumably, could be said about the looking-glass effects described in the previous paragraph: as growth and
bureaucratization dilute the culture-building force of intrafirm interaction, intra-professional reflections become an increasingly important source of self-identity.
Before concluding this discussion of systemic factors, it is important
to note that most large-firm informants (and many plaintiffs' attorneys
and judges, as well) saw trends at the system level as being no more
conducive to ethical practice than trends at the firm and individual
52. Cf Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in OrganizationalFields, 48 Am. Soc.
Rev. 147, 148 (1983) (stating that organizations in the same field are prompted by
external forces to become more similar to one another); W. Richard Scott, The Adolescence of Institutional Theory, 32 Admin. Sci. Q. 493, 494 (1987) (averring that organizations tend to incorporate relevant environmental aspects into their structure).
53. Charles Horton Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order 196-97 (1922).
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levels. On the material side of the ledger, the relevance of individual
reputation diminishes as the profession becomes more national in
scope; and the weight of organizational reputation diminishes as law
firms become more fluid and internally heterogeneous. External
sanctioning agents rarely possess the aptitude or inclination to step
into the breach. While malpractice insurers may demand changes in
law firm structure, they rarely do so with much understanding of the
subtleties of real-world litigation. Even judicial controls are not without problems. Although many informants urged greater judicial oversight of discovery, these calls rang somewhat hollow when viewed in
conjunction with informants' tendency to deride current judicial interventions as ignorant, grandiose, naive, biased, and simplistic. Each
side of the litigation bar-both defendant and plaintiff-saw the judiciary as applying an unjustified double standard in favor of the other,
and few informants seemed to have much tolerance for judges scrutinizing internal firm practices.
On the cultural side, the prognosis was, if anything, even worse. As
mentioned above, informants generally saw profession-level ethics
training as the least satisfying of their various socialization opportunities. Informants viewed the externalization of culture through lateral
hiring as not merely unhelpful but as actively pilloried as a basic cause
of ethical decay. Finally, although some informants welcomed the
feedback that they received from their contacts with opposing counsel, most found these interactions to be culturally coarsening, and
none saw them as an adequate substitute for apprenticeship training
or other intrafirm interactions. If nothing else, the very adversarial
character of the litigation system makes opposing counsel an unreliable source for behavioral guidance.
In short, most of our informants saw the dominant systemic trends
in the legal profession as weakening, not strengthening, ethical control. Large-firm practice has become substantially more marketdriven in recent years-and markets, as social structures built around
"exit" rather than "loyalty and voice,"' tend to erode community,
weaken culture, and discourage moral discourse. Litigation poses a
prisoner's dilemma, in which ethical practice is largely sustained by
each side's faith in the reputation (and the reputation-based interests)
of the other. As one associate put it:
If I'm thinking of the other person as a bastard or a son-of-a-bitch
or "the enemy," that makes me inclined to be very defensive and to
take aggressive positions so that I will have negotiating power. But
54. The reference here is to Albert Hirschman's classic study of organizational
learning, in which he distinguishes two characteristic feedback mechanisms-one in
which disgruntled parties simply terminate their relationship with the organization
("exit"), and another in which they stay despite dissatisfaction ("loyalty") and actively
work for improvement ("voice"). See Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 2143, 76-105 (1970).
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if I trust the other people and trust that they will play fair with us if
we play fair with them, then we won't have to go quite as far.
Under a loyalty/voice regime, the long-term reputational interests of
attorneys, firms, and clients are similar, since together they are all repeat-players. When each of these groups embraces the logic of exit,
however, the system begins to unravel. No one has much incentive to
invest in goodwill, since everyone can plausibly deny responsibility for
prior ethical lapses by blaming some long-gone co-conspirator-saying, in effect, "I didn't want to do it, but I couldn't restrain my asshole
partner/associate/client." As an in-house counsel bluntly stated, "I
don't care about [preserving] the law firm's reputation. I care about
the cost-effective handling of that particular case." In this brave new
world, ethics become situational because instances become decoupled
from identities. Such decoupling would be troubling in any social system, but it is particularly corrosive in a profession where governance
rests almost entirely on culture and reputation.

A

MATrER OF PERSPECtIVE

Before concluding, it is necessary to manage the divergent images
of litigation that emerged from discussions with large-firm litigators,
in-house counsel, plaintiffs' attorneys, and judges, respectively.
Although the research project focused primarily on the ethical world
of the large-firm litigator, that world is necessarily composed, in part,
of the views of each of the other groups represented in the study.
Moreover, as in the time-honored metaphor of the blind men and the
elephant, what these groups saw when they observed the profession
depended largely on where they stood. For readers with a
postmodern bent, this situation allows an encounter with the multivocality of lived experience; for the more positivistically inclined, it represents an opportunity to triangulate on empirical reality from
differing perspectives. Each group offered a distinctive world view,
complete with its own set of ideals, its own definition of the problem,
its own self-justifications, and its own demonology. The resulting hologram is surprisingly coherent, despite its occasional equivocation.
From the perspective of large-firm litigators, the guiding ideal of
legal professionalism resides in the image of a ritualized adversary
55. A provocative illustration of this decoupling can be found in the unwillingness
of cost-conscious clients to subsidize apprenticeship socialization. Both partners and
associates alike bemoaned this state of affairs; yet (as in-house counsel pointed out)
no one suggested that the cost of such socialization should be absorbed by the firm.
In the "'good old days," both clients and law firms had an interest in apprenticeship,
since both benefitted from the reputation and competence of the firm's attorneys.
Under the new regime of mobile clients, mobile partners, and mobile associates, it is
not clear that anyone continues to have such an interest. One partner observed ruefully that "clients used to invest in mentoring for young associates; but today, because
they aren't committed to the firm, they don't want to invest in that anymore." Ironically, it appears that many large-firm partners could say the same about themselves.
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contest-a stylized confrontation in which lawyers serve as zealous
champions for good and bad causes alike, without ever becoming so
close to the principles that they lose sight of the nobility of a game
well-played. As one associate put it, "We are based on an adversarial
system. The assumption is that all the lawyers are reasonably competent, and that you're all out there as agents or knights for your clients,
and you're going to joust it out." In this conceptualization, the primary challenge to the profession lies in preserving the ritual integrity
of the adversary encounter. If problems arise in this regard, they are
most likely attributable either to the failure of over-zealous combatants to acknowledge each other's dignity, or to the failure of meddlesome clients to allow their champions sufficient room to maneuver
and sufficient liberty to fight with honor. Confronted with instances
of ethically dubious obstructionism, large-firm informants tended to
rationalize the behavior by arguing that it is not the defendant's job to
do the plaintiff's work. As long as a litigation tactic leaves one's opponent a recourse within the arena, it is, by assumption, legitimate.
Thus, in discovery, large-firm informants generally saw nothing wrong
with an evasive response that "tees up" the issue for a motion to compel. The ball, although hidden, remains in the field of play, and both
the spirit of the game and the honor of the players remain intact.
To in-house counsel, the paramount ideal of the profession is not
adversarialism, but efficiency. This is true in both the local and the
global sense. The good lawyer provides a cost-effective vehicle for his
or her client's specific interests, and in doing so, he or she also facilitates the efficient functioning of the economy as a whole. The challenge facing the profession, therefore, is to provide a maximum
amount of dispute resolution at a minimum cost. Obstacles to achieving this objective arise from two sources: agency problems in the control of rent-seeking legal representatives, and moral hazards in the
resolution of unwarranted legal harassment. The former peril forces
corporations to overcome inefficient transaction costs in order to settle legitimate claims for their "fair value," while the latter forces corporations to engage in protracted court battles in order to deter
"strike suits" based on frivolous complaints and junk science. In this
milieu, the primary rationalization for stretching ethical boundaries is
to spare corporate executives from wasteful legal distractions-in the
form of either busybody moralists or of pillaging marauders. In the
in-house counsel's ideal world, litigation would simply be commerce
by other means; if getting to this end requires modifying a few feudal
vestiges, that can hardly be a bad thing.
From the perspective of plaintiffs' attorneys, neither the honor of
the game nor the efficiency of the economy lie at the heart of the legal
ideal. Rather, the morality of the justice system rests squarely on its
ability to provide justice. The obstacles to achieving this worthy goal
stem primarily from delay and deception by corporate wrongdoers
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and from the innate elitism of those wrongdoers' various co-conspirators, representatives, and lackeys. In attacking such obstacles, plaintiffs' attorneys rationalize litigation tactics that their opponents might
call uncivil and harassing by arguing that these behaviors are the only
ways to sweat out the smoking gun from a corporation intent on concealing it or to break down the wall of upper-crust arrogance that
keeps the captains of industry from acknowledging industry's victims.
Finally, whereas plaintiffs embrace justice, the judiciary embraces
truth. While judicial informants were somewhat sympathetic to the
virtues of conducting a fair fight, of settling cases before trial, and of
promoting equity, their raison d'etre clearly resides in their ability to
facilitate the revelation of fact and the debunking of fiction. From this
truth seeking perspective, the problem with litigation lies in the tendency of defendants to withhold information 56 and, more importantly,
in the tendency of both sides to pursue their objectives through
counterproductive game-playing. If judges fail to fulfill their ethical
obligations-such as the duty to impose sanctions for discovery
abuse-they tend to justify these actions (or inactions) as efforts to
short-circuit the litigation game. As one judicial informant
commented:
"Our response is to stop playing the game. If we impose sanctions,
then we have litigation within litigation. And how have we advanced
the case? If we award sanctions, we are saying, 'Keep this game
going."'
These alternative perspectives produce a complex demonology, in
which everyone blames everyone else for the profession's failings.
Judges, plaintiffs' attorneys, and in-house counsel all blame large-firm
litigators for showboating to impress clients, for churning cases to generate billable hours, and for reveling excessively in word games and
other aspects of litigation-as-sport. Even large-firm litigators themselves lodge many of these complaints against their "devils within"lateral hires and mid-level partners. Large-firm litigators, plaintiffs'
attorneys, and in-house counsel also blame judges for being too reluctant to sanction misconduct. Judges, for their part, largely accept this
critique but generally pass the buck to their own internal enemy: appellate courts that routinely reverse discovery sanctions on appeal.
Large-firm litigators and in-house counsel further place a large share
of the blame for discovery abuse on plaintiffs' counsel, who are seen
as launching boilerplate strike suits against deep-pocket corporations
and engaging in uncivil harassment merely to raise the settlement
value. While judicial informants were notably silent on this complaint,
the present sample of relatively well-heeled plaintiffs' attorneys responded by deflecting such criticisms downward toward the "incom56. In this sense, the judicial ethic implies a slight pro-plaintiff bias during discovery, since the release of irrelevant information poses less of a threat to truth seeking
than does the concealment of relevant information.
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petent" practitioners at the lower reaches of their bar. Finally, largefirm litigators, judges, and plaintiffs' attorneys all attacked in-house
counsel and/or their executive superiors for being either irrationally
aggressive, unethically withholding, or both. Interestingly, in-house
counsel were the only set of informants who did not attempt to deflect
blame onto an "internal other" (in this case, the logical candidate
would have been non-legal executives). Instead, they vociferously denied the charge of irrational aggressiveness-which they redirected toward outside counsel-and they partially justified withholding, on the
grounds that a more forthcoming stance would simply encourage unethical plaintiffs to go on "fishing trips."
As a final point, it is worth noting that large-firm litigators and inhouse counsel also directed several unique criticisms toward one another-criticisms that were not voiced by either judges or plaintiffs'
attorneys. Outside counsel described their in-house counterparts as
too controlling and demanding, frequently complaining that, in effect,
clients were squeezing ethics out of the practice of law in their efforts
to eliminate every expense that could not be linked to an immediate
financial return. In-house counsel, in return, described outside attorneys as greedy, gutless, and old-fashioned-unwilling to bear the cost
of preserving the ethics that they profess to love, unwilling to pursue
difficult fights without overwhelming firepower, and unwilling to
come to terms with the fact that the modem economy has no place for
bastions of manorial privilege. Illuminated by this opposition among
allies, the ethical dilemmas of the profession leapt into stark relief.
CONCLUSION

The dominant theme emerging from this exploratory investigation
is that litigation ethics are alive, but perhaps not well. Although largefirm litigators appear to define "ethics" narrowly as the letter of professional rules, most of our informants were able to move "beyond the
rules" when pressed. And while their mapping of this murkier terrain
was not exactly what a lay person might expect (or approve), these
lawyers were hardly amoral. At the same time, however, most

seemed to sense that they were working in an increasingly amoral-or
multi-moral-system. Culprits abounded, from judges, to plaintiffs'
attorneys, to in-house counsel, to lateral hires, and to mid-level partners. But, at some level, all of these villains seemed to be merely
scapegoats for a broader structural shift in the nature of large-firm
practice. This transformation has introduced the profession to all of
the performance pressures and profit opportunities of a market-oriented business, while adding little to the profession's historical complement of diffuse cultural and reputational restraints.
At the same time, it may be wise not to make too much of the complaints of a few idiosyncratic segments of the larger bar. Even within
these relatively selective focus groups, only large-firm litigators and
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judges seemed genuinely convinced that the bar faces significant
threats to its integrity-and, given their comments, it seems clear that
neither of these groups would have unanimously labeled the situation
as dire. Further, to the extent that informants did see genuine challenges to the profession's well-being, the situation might plausibly be
characterized as a "crisis of discomfited elites." The groups that complained the most vociferously (large-firm litigators and judges) were
those at the pinnacle of the old order, while the rising factions (plaintiffs' attorneys and in-house counsel) were far more sanguine. Indeed,
one way to read the transition in practice is to see it as a shifting of the
lay/professional interface into the corporation, and away from the law
firm/client relationship. Since professionals experience their greatest
power and autonomy in their interactions with laity, it is hardly surprising that outside counsel feel commodified by the change, and inhouse counsel feel invigorated. While genuine ethical questions remain unanswered, it is unclear whether the situation represents anything more lofty than an intra-professional power struggle.
All of these characterizations are, of course, preliminary at best.
Although our informants were helpful above and beyond the call of
duty, there are certain questions that ten days of discussion simply
cannot resolve. Our conversations failed, for example, to settle such
issues as: whether clients favor litigators with records for aggressiveness, whether clients exacerbate or moderate aggressiveness in ongoing litigation; whether outside counsel "churn" cases to generate
billable hours; and whether they or their in-house counterparts are
generally in charge of the conduct of litigation. Other unresolved issues include the prevalence and impact of large-firm cultures, the differences between routine cases and "bet-your-company" litigation,
and the extent of baseless strike suits. All of these topics are amenable to empirical investigation; however, most would require hypothesis-testing designs that would be far different from the open-ended,
exploratory model employed here.
In the end, then, we are left with a better sense of the contours of
the elite litigator's ethical world, and with an appreciation of the ways
in which that world may be tectonically transformed by changes in the
social organization of practice. Although it is still too early to determine whether the twin pressures of marketization and bureaucratization will topple the legal profession's delicate ethical balance, we can
at least begin to understand the trepidation of large-firm attorneys,
who must stand perched at mid-wire while the thunderheads roll in.

